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Protection for Employee Whistleblowers
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act and
Missouri's Public Policy Exception: What
Happens if the Employee Never Whistled?
Saffels v. Rice1
I. INTRODUCTION

The Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") was implemented by Congress
in 1938 in an attempt to assure most workers of an adequate minimum wage
and payment for overtime wbrk' FLSA § 15(a)(3) was enacted to protect
employees from retaliatory discharges based upon the reporting of violations
of the substantive FLSA provisions In Saffels v. Rice, the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit extended protection to employees who were dismissed
based on the employer's mistaken belief the employee reported violations of
the law to the authorities based on both FLSA § 15(a)(3) and Missouri's
common law public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine. The
court, by extending protection to employees who have taken no protected
action, removed analysis under FLSA § 15(a)(3) from the plain language of
the statute.' Furthermore, the court allowed the plaintiff employees to
proceed under both FLSA § 15(a)(3) and Missouri's common law public
policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine, thus becoming the first
court to hold § 15(a)(3) does not preempt the public policy exception.5

I1. FACTS AND HOLDING
Ronny D. Saffels and Carol S. Morriss filed suit against Kris Rice,
Randall Haynes, and R-B. Industries, Inc. ("Defendants") 6 in the federal
district court for the Western District of Missouri. Saffels and Morriss alleged

1. 40 F.3d 1546 (8th Cir. 1994).
2. 29 U.S.C.A. § 206 (West Supp. 1995). See infra notes 22-73 and
accompanying text.
3. See generallyMitchellv.Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960).
4. See infra notes 97-118 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 145-158 and accompanying text.
6. R.B. Industries, Inc. is a small, family-operated business. Rice is the
company's president and Haynes is the director of finance. Saffels v. Rice, 40 F.3d

1546, 1547 (8th Cir. 1994).
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they had been wrongfuily terminated in violation of § 15(a)(3) of the Fair

Labor Standards Act ("FLSA")7 and Missouri's common law public policy
exception to the at-will employment doctrine.8
Saffels and Morriss were employees of RB. Industries, Inc. Saffels was
first employed by RB. Industries in October 1990 as a telemarketer and was
promoted in April 1991 to telemarketing manager Morriss was hired by
KB. Industries in March 1991 as a telemarketer and was promoted in June
1991 to the accounting department."0 In July 1991, Saffels and Morriss
became romantically involved with each other." Defendants claim this
relationship resulted in poor work performance by Saffels and Morriss. 2 In
late October 1991, Saffels was demoted from telemarketing manager to
telemarketer.' 3
On November 7, 1991, Rice and Haynes met with Saffels and Morriss. 4
At this meeting, Rice informed Saffels that he had reason to believe Saffels
had called the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the
Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Division.15 In fact, neither Morriss

7. Section 15(a)(3) of the Fair Labor Standards Act states:
(a) After the expiration of one hundred and twenty days from June
25, 1938, it shall be unlawful for any person(3) to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any
employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted
or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this
chapter, or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding,
or has served or is about to serve on an industry committee;
29 U.S.C.A. § 215(a)(3) (West Supp. 1995). Section 15(a)(3) of the Fair Labor
Standards Act was codified as § 215(a)(3) in the United States Code.
8. Saffels, 40 F.3d at 1547. Haynes also counterclaimed for defamation against
Saffels and Morriss and assault against Saffels; however, Haynes did not appeal after
the district court entered judgment against him on his counterclaim. Id. at 1547 n.2.
See Loomstein v. Medicare Pharmacies, Inc., 750 S.W.2d 106, 112 (Mo. Ct. App.

1988) (holding that an employee may prevail against an employer on a claim of
discharge in contravention of public policy if the employee can show she was
discharged because she "refused to violate the law or any well established and clear
mandate of public policy as expressed in the constitution, statutes and regulations.").
9. Id. at 1547.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. Rice and Haynes tape recorded this meeting. Id.
15. Id. Several days preceding this meeting, Moriss, while at work, had received
a telephone call from Saffels. At the completion of this call, Morriss announced
"OSHA and Wage and Hour have been called." Apparently, Morriss was referring to
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss4/7
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nor Saffels had contacted OSHA or the Wage and Hour Division. 6 Rice
indicated he had lost faith in Saffels and Morriss and terminated their

employment after the meeting.17
The district court, in granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment,
held Saffels and Morriss did not have standing to sue for wrongful discharge

under either the FLSA or Missouri's common law public policy exception to
the at-will employment doctrine.18 The district court concluded Saffels and
Morriss did not have standing to sue under the FLSA because they never

actually filed a complaint with OSHA or the Wage and Hour Division.'
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in reversing the district court and
remanding for further proceedings, held § 15(a)(3) of the FLSA and the
Missouri common law public policy exception to the at-will employment
doctrine' protect an employee who is terminated on the employer's mistaken
belief the employee reported violations of the law to the authorities. 2
Im. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. § 15(a)(3) of the FairLabor StandardsAct
In 1938, Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") in
order to assure most workers' a uniform minimum wage" and payment for
overtime work.24 Congress stated in § 2 of the FLSA that its policy was to
correct "labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum
standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of

a call made by another employee. Id. at 1547 n.3.
16. Id. at 1548.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1547.
19. Id. at 1548.
20. Oddly, the court did not mention that the great weight of authority has held
§ 15(a)(3) of the FLSA preempts state law public policy remedies for wrongful
discharge. Apparently, the 8th Circuit implicitly overruled previous Missourilaw. See
infra notes 145-158 and accompanying text.
21. Id. at 1550. The court expressed no opinion on whether Rice and Haynes
actually believed Saffels and Morriss had reported violations to OSHA and the Wage
and Hour Division; rather, the court remanded to the district court to decide the issue.
Id.
22. The FLSA only applies to workers that are employed in interstate commerce.
See Stewart v. Region II Child & Family Servs., 788 P.2d 913, 917 (Mont. 1990).
23. 29 U.S.C.A. § 206 (West Supp. 1995).
24. Id. § 207.
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workers."'
In addition to providing substantive rights, the FLSA makes it
illegal to discharge or discriminate against any employee in retaliation for
filing a complaint, instituting a proceeding under the FLSA, or testifying in
a proceeding.26 Furthermore, the FLSA provides specific remedies to
employees, and against employers, for violations of § 15(a)(3).'
For
instance, § 216(b) provides that an employee may bring an action in federal
or state court for "reinstatement, promotion, and the payment of wages lost
and an additional equal amount as liquidated damages."2 "
The United States Supreme Court construed the apparent Congressional
policy behind FLSA § 15(a)(3) in Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry,
Inc."' Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, explained "Congress did not
seek to secure compliance with prescribed standards through continuing
detailed federal supervision ...[r]ather it chose to rely on information...
from employees."3
Therefore, Justice Harlan argued that "effective
enforcement [of the FLSA] could... only be expected if employees felt free
to approach officials with their grievances."31 Consequently, § 15(a)(3) was
promulgated in order to "foster a climate"3 in the workplace that would
safeguard employee rights under the substantive FLSA provisions.3
An aggrieved employee may choose to prove a violation of § 15(a)(3)
either by direct or indirect evidence. 4 If the employee chooses to prove a
violation by indirect evidence, the employee must present a prima facie case
of discrimination.35 In order to present a prima facie case, an employee

25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. § 202(a).
Id. § 215(a)(3).
Id. § 216(b); see, e.g., Dockins v. Ingles Markets, 413 S.E.2d 18 (S.C. 1992).
Id.

29. 361 U.S. 288 (1960).
30. Id. at 292.
31. Id. Justice Harlan assumed that fear of discharge, without § 15(a)(3), would

often force employees to accept the very conditions that Congress attempted to remedy
with the FLSA. Id.
32. Id. This "foster a climate" language has been used to justify substantially

broader readings of § 15(a)(3) than the plain language of the section would appear to
justify. See infra note 73.
33. Id.
34. See generally Strickland v. MICA Info. Sys., 800 F. Supp. 1320, 1323

(M.D.N.C. 1992). Obviously, there may often be a dearth of direct evidence regarding
the employer's intentions.
35. Malone v. Signal Processing Technologies, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 370, 376 (D.
Co. 1993). The United States Supreme Court first fashioned this approach in Title VII
controversies because of the difficulty plaintiffs experience in attempting to show
retaliatory actions by employers. It has been extended to actions under FLSA
§ 15(a)(3) due to the same difficulty. Strickland, 800 F. Supp. at 1323 (quoting
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss4/7
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"must demonstrate that (1) the employer was aware of [the employee's]
participation in protected activity; (2) that an adverse employment action was
taken against the [employee] engaged in the protected activity; and (3) that thq.
two elements are related causally."36 Once the employee has met this
burden, the employer may present evidence showing a permissible reason for
the adverse employment action."
In some cases, an aggrieved employee may be able to present direct
evidence that an adverse employment action is in violation of § 15(a)(3)."
In such a situation, the employee does not need to resort to the three-pronged
approach because the employee can present a prima facie case by direct
evidence.39 However, in order to prevail, the employee must first
demonstrate that she has standing under § 15(a)(3)." Few courts have had
the opportunity to analyze the standing issue under § 15(a)(3) because prior
to 197741 the "vast majority of cases ...

were brought by the Secretary of

Labor"42 and these cases were nearly always initiated by a complaint. 3
In the few cases analyzing the issue, courts have frequently extended
standing to employees who have engaged in activities not specifically

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 793 (1973)). This approach has
the effect of shifting the burden of production after the plaintiff presents a prima facie
case.

36. Strickland, 800 F. Supp. at 1323. The same approach is utilized when
analyzing an alleged retaliatory discharge under the Occupational Health and Safety
Act (OSHA). See Reichv. Hoy Shoe Co., 32 F.3d 361, 365 (8th Cir. 1994).
37. Id. The employee may still prevail at this point if the employer's reasons are
found to be pretextual. Id.
38. This is the approach Saffels and Morriss took. Saffels, 40 F.3d at 1547.
39. See supranote 34 and accompanying text.
40. Hayes v. McIntosh, 604 F. Supp. 10, 15 (N.D. Ind. 1984). In other words,
the employee must show she "fall[s] within the protection of . . . 29 U.S.C.
§ 215(a)(3)." Id. An employee who chooses to present her case by indirect evidence
must show "participation in a protected activity" which is the equivalent of showing
standing. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
41. Prior to 1977, the Secretary of Labor had exclusive authority to institute
actions under FLSA § 15(a)(3). See, e.g., Reeves v. rTT, 616 F.2d 1342, 1348 (5th
Cir. 1980). However, some courts inferred Congressional intent to provide a private
cause of action. See, e.g., Boll v. Federal Reserve Bank, 365 F. Supp. 637, 650 (E.D.
Mo. 1973), aft'd, 497 F.2d 335 (8th Cir. 1974). Section 216(b) was amended in 1977
to explicitly provide for private actions by aggrieved employees under § 215(a)(3).
See generallyReeves, 616 F.2d at 1350.
42. Hayes, 604 F. Supp. at 15.
43. Id. If the employee filed a complaint under the FLSA, she clearly has
standing under § 15(a)(3). 29 U.S.C.A. § 215(a)(3) (West Supp. 1995).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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enumerated in § 15(a)(3). 44 For instance, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in Brock v. Casey Truck Sales, Inc. 4' held the discharge of
five employees for their failure to take a "loyalty oath"4' and repudiate their
rights under the FLSA violated FLSA § 15(a)(3). 4 ' The five employees had
been interviewed by an officer of the United States Department of Labor
concerning lack of payment for overtime.4 ' The officer had determined that
the five employees were owed approximately $24,000 in back overtime and
the employer agreed to pay the amount.49 However, the employer then
attempted to coerce the five employees into not accepting the money." The
court reasoned that, although the employees had not engaged in any activities
specifically protected under § 15(a)(3), 5" allowing an employer to coerce
employees 52
into giving up FLSA benefit's would make those benefits
"worthless."' Therefore, the court held § 15(a)(3) applies to "activities less
directly connected to formal proceedings where retaliatory conduct has a
similar chilling effect on employees' assertion of rights."53
One test for standing under § 15(a)(3) was enunciated by the court in
Wirtz v. C.H. Valentine Lumber Co. 4 and followed in Hayes v. McIntosh.5"
The CH.Valentine Lumber Co. court stated that § 15(a)(3) "protect[s] those
employees who have made apositive and overt act within the language of the
statute.,56 The court went on to explain that "some positive action"57 was

44. See Wirtz v. Ross Packaging Co., 367 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1966). Recall that
§ 15(a)(3) specifically makes it illegal to discriminate against employees based on the
fact that the employee has "filed any complaint or instituted.. . any proceeding...
or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding, or has served or is about
to serve on an industry committee." 29 U.S.C.A. § 215(a)(3) (West Supp. 1995).
45. 839 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1988).
46. Id. at 879.

47. Id. See also Brennan v. Maxey's Yamaha, Inc., 513 F.2d 179, 181-82 (8th
Cir. 1975) (holding on nearly identical facts as those in Brock that the employer had
violated the aggrieved employee's § 15(a)(3) rights by attempting to force the
employee to repudiate her FLSA rights.)
48. Brock, 839 F.2d at 874.
49. Id. at 875.
50. Id. at 875-76.
51. Arguably, that the five employees testified in "any proceeding" when they
were interviewed by the Labor Department officer.
52. Brock, 839 F.2d at 879.
53. Id.
54. 236 F. Supp. 616 (E.D.S.C. 1964).

55. 604 F. Supp. 10 (N.D.Ind. 1984).
56. C.H.ValentineLumberCo., 236 F. Supp. at 620 (emphasis added). The court
prefaced this statement by declaring that it found it unnecessary to decide the issue,

thus apparently making the statement dictum. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss4/7
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required of an employee before § 15(a)(3) could be violated by an
employer.58 The Department of Labor had investigated the employer and
determined certain employees were owed back wages. However, the
aggrieved employees had never filed a complaint, instituted an action, or
demanded payment of their back wages.5 9 Therefore, the court held the
aggrieved employees had not made a positive and overt action under
§ 15(a)(3) and therefore could not claim its protection.6"
The Hayes court adopted the "positive and overt act" test in holding an
employee had standing under § 15(a)(3). 6 The employee had spoken with
a Department of Labor official, signed a statement for that official, refused to
return a back pay check to the employer, and informed the employer of his
intention to notify the Wage and Hour division about the situation.62 The
court concluded "[tihese activities ...

constitute[d] sufficient 'positive and

overt' acts within the meaning, and protection, of section [15(a)(3)] so as to
permit [the employee] to bring ...

suit."'6

The court reasoned its holding

was necessary to ensure "employees felt free to approach officials with their
grievances."64
Until Saffels, the Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit in Brock v.
Richardson61 was the only court that had addressed the issue of whether an
employee had standing under § 15(a)(3) if she was discharged upon the
employer's erroneous belief that the employee had filed a complaint under the
FLSA.66 In Richardson, the employer told a Wage and Hour Division
investigator that she had fired the aggrieved employee because she believed
the employee had filed a complaint with the Wage and Hour Division.67 In
fact, the employee had not filed a complaint. 68 The court recognized
§ 15(a)(3) had been interpreted broadly in order to incorporate activities that
are not "explicitly covered" by the statutory language. 69 Next, the court

57. Id.
58. Id. See infranotes 137-144 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
rationale behind this test.
59. Id. at 618-19.
60. Id. at 619-620.
61. Hayes, 604 F. Supp. at 17.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. (citing Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292
(1960)).
65. 812 F.2d 121 (3rd Cir. 1987).
66. Id. at 123.
67. Id. at 122-23.
68. Id. at 122.
69. Id. at 124. See Love v. RE/MAX of America Inc., 738 F.2d 383, 387 (10th
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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looked to cases
arising under § 158(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA") 70 holding that employees are protected by the NLRA even if they
did not engage in protected activities. 1 Finally, the court held the policy
behind the FLSA72 made it "evident that the discharge of an employee in the
mistaken belief that the employee has engaged in protected activity creates the
same atmosphere of intimidation as does the discharge of an employee who
73
did in fact complain of FLSA violations.1

B. The Public Policy Exception to Missouri'sAt-Will Employment
Doctrine74
Missouri courts recognize a "narrow"75 exception to the employment atwill doctrine76 for employees who are discharged in contravention of public

Cir. 1984) (holding employee who complained to employer about FLSA violations has
standing); Brennan v. Maxey's Yamaha, Inc., 513 F.2d 179, 183 (8th Cir. 1975)
(holding employer who attempted to coerce employee into repudiating FLSA rights
violated § 15(a)(3)).
70. Section 158(a)(3) of the NLRA states:
(a) Unfair labor practices for an employer

It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization
29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a)(3) (West Supp. 1995).
The NLRA and the FLSA were passed by Congress at the same time and "NLRA
cases are often considered of assistance in interpreting" the FLSA. Brock, 812 F.2d
at 124.
71. Brock, 812 F.2d at 124-25. See N.L.R.B. v. Ritchie Mfg. Co., 354 F.2d 90,
98 (8th Cir. 1966) (holding employer violated NLRA by discharging an employee
believed to be involved in union activity); N.L.R.B. v. Clinton Packing Co., 468 F.2d
953, 955 (8th Cir. 1972).
72. See supranotes 29-33 and accompanying text.
73. Brock, 812 F.2d at 125.
74. This is often referred to as the "whistle-blower" exception. See Komm v.
McFliker, 662 F. Supp. 924, 926 (W.D. Mo. 1987).
75. See Lay v. St. Louis Helicopter Airways, Inc., 869 S.W.2d 173, 176 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1993); Prewitt v. Factory Motor Parts, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 560, 566 (W.D. Mo.
1990).
76. See Dake v. Tuell, 687 S.W.2d 191, 193 (Mo. 1985) ("Under Missouri's
employment atwill doctrine anemployer can discharge--for cause orwithout cause--an
at will employee who does not otherwise fall within the protective reach of a contrary
statutory provision and still not be subject to liability for wrongful discharge.")
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss4/7
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policy. 7 The Missouri Supreme Court in Johnson v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp." limited the public policy exception to employees who were
discharged in violation of a policy that was stated in "a constitutional
provision, a statute, or a regulation based on a statute."'79 Furthermore, the
public policy exception only applies to employees at-will and not contract
employees."0
The purpose behind the public policy exception "is the vindication or the
protection of certain strong policies of the community."8 " Therefore, several
Missouri courts have held that if these policies are adequately safeguarded by
other remedies, the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine
does not apply." For instance, the court in Gannon v. Sherwood Medical
Co.' held that allowing an employee to make a wrongful discharge claim
pursuant to the public policy exception as well as a wrongful discharge claim
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") 4 and the
Missouri Workers' Compensation Act8 5 would be "duplicative and
unwarranted."8 6 Since both the ADEA and the Workers' Compensation Act
contain remedial provisions, the court held they preempted the public policy
exception.'
The federal district court for the Western District of Missouri decided a
case in which the aggrieved employee asserted both a common law wrongful
discharge claim based on the public policy exception and a statutory claim
The court, in dismissing the wrongful
based on FLSA § 15(a)(3).'
discharge claim based on the public policy exception, 9 stated "[t]he public
policy that would be furthered by a wrongful discharge claim based on a
77. See Johnsonv. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 745 S.W.2d 661, 663 (Mo. 1988);
Loomsteinv. Medicare Pharmacies, Inc., 750 S.W.2d 106, 112 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988);
Komm, 662 F. Supp. at 925-26.
78. 745 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. 1988).
79. Id. at 663.
80. See Luethans v. Washington Univ., 838 S.W.2d 117, 120 n.1 (Mo. Ct. App.
1992); Komm, 662 F. Supp. at 925-26.
81. Prewittv. Factory Motor Parts, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 560, 565 (W.D. Mo. 1990).
82. Id.; Gannon v. Sherwood Medical Co., 749 F. Supp. 979, 981 (E.D. Mo.
1990); Kramer v. St. Louis Regional Health Care Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1317, 1318-19
(E.D. Mo. 1991).
83. 749 F. Supp. 979 (E.D. Mo. 1990).
84. 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 (West Supp. 1995).
85. Mo. REv. STAT. § 287.780 (1994).
86. Gannon, 749 F. Supp. at 981.
87. Id.
88. Prewitt,747 F. Supp. at 565.
89. Specifically, the court held that the employee failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. Id. at 566.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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violation of § 215(a)(3) is fully vindicated by [the employee's] claim in
Count I brought pursuant to the FLSA."90
Courts across the nation have held claims under common law public
policy exceptions are preempted by the FLSA. These courts have advanced
several reasons in support of their finding of preemption. For instance, the
court in Tate v. Pepsi Cola Metro. Bottling Co.9' reasoned that FLSA
§ 15(a)(3) preempted Wisconsin's common law public policy exception
because the FLSA "provid[ed] its own exhaustive enforcement remedies."'
The court in Jarmocv. ConsolidatedElec. Distrib., Inc. ' decided the FLSA
preempted state law because it contained sufficient remedies to deter improper
employer conduct.94 Courts have generally expressed concern that allowing
claims under the state common law public policy exceptions will "upset the
balance struck by Congress in enacting the FLSA."'95 This fear is sparked by
the fact that employees may gain a "substantially larger damage award in a
wrongful discharge case" than they might under FLSA § 15(a)(3) alone.96
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Saffels v. Rice, the Eighth Circuit examined whether an employee was
protected by the common law public policy exception and/or by FLSA
§ 15(a)(3) from discharge based upon the employer's erroneous belief the
employee had reported FLSA violations.'
The court analyzed FLSA
§ 15(a)(3) by three major methods.9"
First, the court looked at cases that had extended protection to aggrieved
employees beyond the plain language of § 15(a)(3).99 However, the court
90. Id.

91. 32 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCI) 33,951 (E.D. Wis. 1983), aff'd, 742 F.2d 1459
(7th Cir. 1984).
92. Id. at 31,512. See also Corbin v. Sinclair Marketing, Inc., 684 P.2d 265, 267
(Colo. Ct. App. 1984).
93. 123 Lab. Cas. (CCI-I) 35,701 (N.D. IM.1992).
94. Id. at 48,458. The court noted the FLSA's liquidated damages clause and
potential criminal sanctions are sufficient to deter improper employer conduct. Id.
95. Michael D. Moberly, FairLaborStandardsActPreemptionof"PublicPolicy"
Wrongful DischargeClaims, 42 DRAKu L. REV. 525, 562 (1993) (citing Lerwill v.
Inflight Motion Pictures, 343 F. Supp. 1027, 1028 (N.D. Cal. 1972)).
96. Victoria W. Shelton, Note, Will the Public Policy Exception to the
Employment-at-will Doctrine Ever Be Clear?-Amos v. Oakdale Knitting Co., 14
CAMPBELL L. REv. 123, 133 (1991).
97. Saffels, 40 F.3d at 1548.
98. See infra note 99-111.
99. Saffles, 40 F.3d at 1548-49. The court noted cases such as Brockv. Casey
Truck Sales, Inc. and Brennan v. Maney's Yamaha, Inc had extended § 15(a)(3)
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss4/7
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noted that all of the cited cases involved employees who had "assert[ed]
protected rights."1 ' Furthermore, the court recognized that Saffels and
Morriss allegedly had not engaged in any "protected activity." 10 1 Therefore,
the court decided to go beyond previous case law.'"
The court
Next, the court probed the policy behind the FLSA. 10'
observed that one of the Congressional policies behind § 15(a)(3) was to
encourage employees to report violations to the authorities."' In order to
effectuate this policy, the court reasoned § 15(a)(3) must be read broadly in
order to "foster an environment in which employees are unfettered in their
decision to voice grievances without 'fear of economic retaliation.""' 5
Therefore, the court decided the statute's "animating spirit"'0 6 encompassed
"activit[ies] that fall outside the express wording of the statute."'0 7
Finally, the court examined and adopted the Third Circuit's reasoning in
In relying on Richardson, the court explicitly
Brock v. Richardson.'
adopted the support of various cases under the National Labor Relations Act
and the Occupational Safety and Health Act.' In addition to adopting the
reasoning in Richardson, the court noted giving protection to Saffels and
Morriss under § 15(a)(3) would "in no way diminish" ' 01a the FLSA policy
of encouraging the reporting of violations by employees."
The court held Saffels and Morriss had stated a claim under Missouri's
common law public policy exception to the employment at-will doctrine."'
The court, in citing Johnson,"' noted that Saffels' and Morriss' claim arose
under a statute; namely, FLSA § 15(a)(3)." 4 Furthermore, the court stated

protection to employees that had not met the formal requirements of § 15(a)(3). See
supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
100. Saffles, 40 F.3d at 1548.
101. Id. at 1549.
102. Id.
103. Id.

104. Id.
105. Id. (citing Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292

(1960)).
106. Id. (citing Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d 121, 124 (3rd Cir. 1987).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1549-50.
109. Id. at 1549. See supranotes 70-71 and accompanying text for cases under
the NLRA and OSHA.
110. Id. at 1549-50.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1550. At no time did the court discuss preemption.
113. See supranotes 78-80 and accompanying text.
114. Saffels, 40 F.3d at 1550.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995

11

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 4 [1995], Art. 7

MISSOURILAW REVIEW[

[Vol. 60

that discouraging employers from discharging employees based on an
erroneous belief the employee had reported FLSA violations was "in the realm
of . . . sound public policy." ' Therefore, the court reversed the district
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant and remanded
for further proceedings." 6
Judge Hansen briefly dissented from the majority opinion." 7 He
recognized § 15(a)(3) had been broadly interpreted in order to protect
employees. However, Judge Hansen felt the majority opinion in effect
"amended" the FLSA to protect Saffels and Morriss."'

V. COMMENT
The Eighth Circuit's decision in Saffels v. Rice made two questionable
extensions of existing law. First, the court extended protection under FLSA
§ 15(a)(3) to employees who have not taken any action that is remotely
associated with the FLSA. 1
This action by the court does nothing to
further the underlying policies of the FLSA. Second, and perhaps more
importantly, the court extended coverage of Missouri's common law public
policy exception to these employees, thus implicitly holding FLSA § 15(a)(3)
does not preempt the Missouri common law public policy exception to the
employment at-will doctrine."
This holding makes the Eighth Circuit the
first court to fail to find the FLSA preempts state law wrongful discharge
claims.
A. Extension of FLSA § 15(a)(3)
Before Saffels and Richardson, analysis of § 15(a)(3) began by
interpreting whether an aggrieved employee had "filed any complaint or
instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under... this chapter, or
has testified . . . in any such proceeding.". 21 Depending on whether the
employee chose to present direct or indirect evidence of a retaliatory
discharge, his or her first hurdle was to prove either "standing" 2 2 or
engagement in a "protected activity."'" Although courts have construed

115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at n.6.
Id. at 1550-51.
Id. at 1551.
Id.

119. See infra notes 121-144 and accompanying text.

120.
121.
122.
123.

See infra notes 146-158 and accompanying text.
29 U.S.C.A. § 215(a)(3) (West 1995).
See supranotes 40-73 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text; Strickland v. MICA
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12

1995]

Le Riche: Le Riche: Protection for Employee Whistleblowers
FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT

these tests liberally, 2 every court before Saffels and Richardson had
required the employee to have taken some positive action.1"
The Saffels court recognized it was extending protection under § 15(a)(3)
to employees who had taken no positive action and attempted to bolster its
position by invoking the policy behind § 15(a)(3).' 26 The court explicitly
acknowledged "the FLSA's underlying purpose [is] that employees, not the
federal government, serve as the enforcement mechanism for the act". 127
The court argued that its extension of § 15(a)(3) was necessary to "foster an
environment "' in which employees would feel free to voice
complaints. 2 9 However, the court went on to reason "[n]othing in [its]
from coming
reading of [§] 15(a)(3) will discourage or prevent employees
30
forward with reports of wrongdoing by their employers.'
The Eighth Circuit has previously stated "[t]he sole object of [statutory]
construction is to determine the legislative intent. Such intent must be found
primarily in the language of the statute itself ...

."1

Furthermore, the

court should "construe [the statute] as to effectuate and not destroy the spirit
and force of the law ....

,,

In other words, the Saffels court should have

looked primarily to the language of the statute13 in order to effectuate the
intent of Congress. However, the court took a backwards approach by arguing
that at least its holding did not defeat the statute's purpose. 34 Perhaps the
court chose this rationalization because it is difficult to explain how protecting

Information Systems, 800 F. Supp. 1320, 1323 (M.D. N.C. 1992).
124. See supra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
125. See, e.g., Hayes, 604 F. Supp. at 17 (requiring some "positive and overt"
action by the employee); Strickland,800 F. Supp. at 1323 (requiring the employee to
show participation in a "protected activity"); Casey Truck Sales, Inc., 839 F.2d at 879
(extending coverage under § 15(a)(3) to "activities" not connected with formal
proceedings) (emphasis added).
126. Saffels, 40 F.3d at 1549.
127. Id. at 1549-50.
128. Id. (citing Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. at 292).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1550 (emphasis added).
131. Premachandra v. Mitts, 727 F.2d 717, 727 (8th Cir. 1984).
132. Id.

133. The United States Supreme Court has stated "[i]n the absence of persuasive
reasons to the contrary, we attribute to the words of a statute their ordinary meaning."
Banks v. Chicago Grain Trimmers Assoc., 390 U.S. 459, 465 (1968). The Saffels
court obviously wentwell beyond the ordinary meaning of the language in § 15(a)(3).
134. Recall that the court argued its holding would not "discourage or prevent"
employees from voicing their complaints. However, § 15(a)(3)'s purpose is to
encourage employees to voice their complaints. See supra notes 110-111 and
accompanying text.
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an employee who may have never even considered voicing a complaint'35
would further the FLSA policy of encouraging employees to report violations
of the FLSA." 6

The decision in Saffels untethers § 15(a)(3) analysis from the language
of the statute.'37 In order to invoke § 15(a)(3), the plain language of the
statute requires an employee to file a complaint, institute a proceeding, or
testify in a proceeding.' 38 Although previous courts had interpreted these
phrases broadly,'39 all* (except Richardson) had at least required a "positive
and overt act"'4 ° by the employee.'
Under the reasoning of Saffels, the
relevant analysis no longer focuses on the actions of the employee.'
Therefore, there appears to be nothing limiting courts' analysis except that §
15(a)(3) should be interpreted so as to "foster an environment" in which
employees "feel free to approach. . . officials with their grievances.""' It
is unclear exactly how far a court can stray from the plain language of §
44
15(a)(3) in order to create this "environment.'

135. Apparently, under Saffels' reasoning, the employee does not even have to be
awarethat there is an FLSA violation. In fact, the same reasoning would allow the
court to find for the employees even if no FLSA violation occurred. As long as the
employer subjectively "thought" the employee had contacted the authorities and then
terminated the employee, § 15(a)(3) would be violated. This does nothing to further
the policy that employees report FLSA violations.
136. Prior to Saffels, § 15(a)(3) already had been interpreted to protect employees
who asserted FLSA rights either officially or at work. Therefore, any employee who
actually voiced a complaint would be protected. See Bonhamv. Copper Cellar Corp.,
476 F. Supp. 98, 103 (E.D. Tenn. 1979).
137. The court analogized FLSA § 15(a)(3) to § 8(a)(3) of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA). However, § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA makes it illegal to
"discourage membership in any labor organization." 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a)(3) (West
1995). This language would allow a court to find that dismissing an employee on the
erroneous belief the employee had participated in union activities "discourages
membership" in the union and is thus statutorily prohibited. See generallyN.L.R.B.
v. Clinton Packing Co., 468 F.2d 953 (8th Cir. 1972).
138. 29 U.S.C.A. § 215(a)(3) (West 1995).
139. See supra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
140. C.H. Valentine Lumber Inc., 236 F. Supp. at 620.
141. See supra notes 54-64 and accompanying text.
142. Saffels, 40 F.3d at 1550. The court never explicitly stated the employee's
actions do not matter; however, the court held the employer's erroneous belief the
employees had "reported violations or otherwise engaged in protected activity" was
sufficient to afford them protection under § 15(a)(3). Id.
143. Id. at 1549.
144. See supra note 135.
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The court's reasoning is flawed in that it explicitly recognized that the
FLSA's purpose is to act as an incentive for employees to report violations of
the substantive FLSA provisions. However, the court's holding is designed
to act as a disincentive to employers who terminate employees in bad faith.
The holding in Saffles effectivelypunishes employers based on their subjective
beliefs about their employees' actions. Therefore, the holding does nothing
to further the purposes of FLSA § 15(a)(3).
B. FLSA §7 15(a)(3) preemption of Missouri common law public
policy exception to the employment at-will doctrine
Although the Eighth Circuit never addressed the issue, it calls into
question prior case law'45 by allowing Saffels and Morriss to assert claims
under the Missouri common law public policy exception as well as FLSA
§ 15(a)(3).' 46 This implicit holding appears to make the Eighth Circuit the
first court to have held FLSA § 15(a)(3) does not preempt common law
wrongful discharge claims based on the public policy behind the FLSA.147
Since the Saffels court did not address the preemption issue, it is difficult
to determine whether preemption should have been found. The United States

Supreme Court has stated that state law is preempted if "the state law stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of
The Prewitt court, in finding preemption,"' observed that
Congress. '
"[a] statutory right of action shall not be deemed to supersede and displace
remedies otherwise available at common law in the absence of language to
that effect unless the statutory remedy fully comprehends and envelopes the
remedies provided by common law."' 0 Since the Saffels court held both
§ 15(a)(3) and Missouri's common law public policy exception protect
employees from discharge based on their employer's erroneous belief the

145. The federal district court for the Western District of Missouri had held
§ 15(a)(3) preempted claims under Missouri's common law public policy exception

that were based on the policy underlying the FLSA. Prewitt, 747 F. Supp. at 565.
See supranotes 81-96 and accompanying text.
146. Saffels, 40 F.3d at 1550. The record does not disclose whether the issue was

briefed to the Eighth Circuit.
147. See Moberly supranote 95 at 562 (stating "[elvery court to have addressed
the issue has concluded . . . the remedies available under the FLSA preempt a
common-law wrongful discharge claim premised on the public policy reflected in the

FLSA").
148. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984).

149. See supranotes 88-90 and accompanying text.
150. Prewitt,747 F. Supp. at 565 (citing Detling v. Edelbrock, 671 S.W.2d 265,
271-72 (Mo. 1984)).
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employee reported violations of the law to the authorities, 5' it would appear
that preemption was warranted because of the complete overlap of
remedies.'52
By not finding preemption, the Saffels court risks thwarting Congress'
attempt (through the FLSA) to carefully balance the need for a minimum level
of compensation for employees with the potentially disruptive effecta uniform
minimum wage may have on employers.'5 3 In fact, one court has noted that
Congress has repeatedly amended the FLSA in order to maintain this tenuous
balance.'
Both courts and commentators alike have recognized that the
common law wrongful discharge claim offers an aggrieved employee a larger
award than s/he could gain under FLSA § 15(a)(3).'55 Allowing recovery
under both the FLSA and the state common law public policy exception would
be duplicative; 56 thereby upsetting the balance Congress has sought to
attain. 57 Furthermore, allowing an employee to pursue both remedies might
actually encourage the employee to completely bypass the FLSA. 58

151. Saffels, 40 F.3d at 1550.
152. If,
for example, the court had found FLSA § 15(a)(3) did not protect Saffels
and Morriss, a finding that they were protected by the public policy exception would
have made sense. Of course, the court would have to have first found that Saffels' and
Morriss' discharge was protected by public policy affirmatively set forth in "a statute,
a regulation based on a statute, or a constitutional provision." Johnson, 745 S.W.2d
at 663.
153. See Lerwill v. Inflight Motion Pictures, 343 F. Supp. 1027, 1029 (N.D. Cal.
1972). Some courts and commentators have argued that allowing recovery under the
state common law public policy exceptionwould adversely affect economic growth by
discouraging new employment. See Shelton, supranote96, at 133; Comanv. Thomas
Mfg. Co., 381 S.E.2d 445, 452 (N.C. 1991) (Meyer, J., dissenting).
154. Lerwill, 343 F. Supp. 1029.
155. See supranote 96 and accompanying text; Chappell v. Southern Md. Hosp.,
578 A.2d 766, 774 (Md. 1990).
156. Since recovery under the common law public policy exception is larger than
under the FLSA, even non-duplicative recovery would upset the balance.
157. See Moberly, supranote 95, at 545 (stating that "the [harm to employers by
minimumwage laws] would be exacerbated by the recognition of awrongful discharge
tort claim based on the public policy expressed in the FLSA").
158. See M.E. Knack, Note, Do State Fair Employment Statutes by "Negative
Implication"Preclude Common-Law Wrongful DischargeClaimsBased on the Public
Policy Exception?, 21 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 527, 533 (1991) (arguing that employees
would pursue the state law public policy claim because it would offer more damages);
Moberly, supranote 95, at 558 (arguing that allowing the public policy claim "with
its attendant tort remedies .. .undoubtedly would have the effect of encouraging
[employees] to bypass the FLSA's remedial scheme ...... ") (footnote omitted).
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989

VI. CONCLUSION

In Saffels v. Rice, the Eighth Circuit turned the plain meaning of FLSA
§ 15(a)(3) on its head. Instead of analyzing the statute as an incentive to
encourage employees to file complaints, the court used the statute to punish
what it considered bad faith conduct by the employer. In so doing, the court
failed to enunciate any clear standard with which to limit employers' liability.
Furthermore, the court failed to discuss previous case law holding that
§ 15(a)(3) preempted Missouri's common law public policy exception to the
at-will employment doctrine. Therefore, the court missed an opportunity to
weigh the advantages of preemption and make a rational decision whether to
support the prior case law.
JEFF LE RICHE
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